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IN LUCE TUA

The Aftermath of the Truce

Could the responses to the truce in
Viet Nam have been any more mixed?
Although the responses are far less
shrill than were the objections to the
war, the same confusions about the
war appear in the responses to the
truce, differences of opinion before
the truce continue after it.
It was to be expected that scepticism would be pervasive, for hopes
had been aroused and dashed frequently enough. Doubt about the
reality of the truce infected the thinking of many of the common citizens
who were not privy to details of the
negotiations. The patience of the
negotiators was maddening to some
and caused suspicion in others.
Apprehension about the parties
keeping the truce was experienced
by many, and expressed for us all
in the questions of the newsmen during the interview with Dr. Kissinger.
Among the people where I live
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there was more of a sense of relief
than there was jubilation and celebration. The mixed responses produced their own confusion. The
official end of the fighting and the
terms of the truce nourished in some
the criticism that the same end and
equivalent terms could have been
reached sooner: some argued that
it could have been four years sooner.
The absence o.f any sense of celebration of the truce nourished also the
guilt about such a response. Restraint in the celebration has become
a quasi official style for response to
the returning prisoners.
This is not to say there was or is no
joy and thanksgiving about the
truce , about the return of prisoners
to their homes. The doubts and confusion did not destroy that rejoicing, especially for those who were
living on a trust, however fragile,
and who were engaging in expectant
prayer with the God who judges
nations, who uses one nation to knock
down another nation, who breaks
the weapons of war and gives peace.
The most pathetic responses were

from those who have made the war
in Viet Nam the juice and energy of
their cause. Living in the hope that
the worse it was for our country in
the war the better it was for their
revolution, they suddenly find themselves without a cause. It is not that
there are not enough problems,
locally, nationally, and internationally; it is that the oversimplified
slogans about ~any of the other
issues will not serve to galvanize the
attention of so many people.
We have not seen the end of the
search for a cause, a search to be
distinguished sharply from a real
and concerted attack on real problems. One element in that search for
a cause will be in the form of using
the category of "guilt" as the way to
examine the Viet Nam involvement.
I am suspicious of the use of guilt as
a political category, largely because
there are no political ways to pronounce absolution. The cry of guilt,
aimed at making some one guilty
for the evil done, achieves the end of
making people guilty (without any
means for dealing with the guilt)
3

or drives them tenaciously to continue in the same course in order to
prove they are right, not guilty.
What is needed is a change in the
course of action, a change of direction. Least effective for such change
is the category of guilt. If it does not
paralyze a nation in despair, such a
category can drive the nation to use
its new actions or new programs as
acts of atonement.
Return and Reconstruction

The returning prisoners of war
may furnish us with a kind of parable
on the larger scene of return and
reconstruction. Preliminary reports
indicate that generally they are in
"good" condition. Maybe this is a
surprise but it is a good surprise. In
addition to the care they received
which contributed to that "good"
condition, there are some remarkable stories about their care for each
other, about their discipline, their
development of a community in
which each contributed to and received from the others. They themselves - at least through their spokesmen - have expressed their delight
to be home, their gratitude to the
American people and to the President. On any scale of values they
have suffered more than we. And the
strain on them will be as much as
any of the rest of us will endure.
They will be rebuilding relationships
with spouses and children. They
will be reconstructing their life of
work and community. We think
their delight and gratitude is a good
first step. We hope their families
and friends, their pastors and counselors, their employers and political
authorities will join them and be
joined by them . We bespeak our
good will to their neighborhoods
and local communities as they receive these people back into their
lives.
Isn't this kind of return and this
kind of reconstruction the kind that
needs engagement by everyone?
The delight and gratitude, the discipline and respect, and the mutual
learning and teaching, offer more
prospect of reconstruction of family ,
4

work, and community than do the
guilt-ridden accusations which turn
all our efforts into the use of other
people as scape-goats, as instruments
for atonement for our own wrongs.
How can we use the memory of
our suffering and grief, or shall we
forget it and become merely brutish?
We will need to be reminded, and
for that reminder there should be
enough help. The missing will be
missed; the maimed in. body and
mind will recall the suffering. The
inability of some to reconstruct
lives will never let us forget the size
of the task ahead. But it will still be
possible to become mechanical in
our care, sentimental in our slogans,
and self-atoning in our restitution.
0

Death of a Broken Heart?

Is it possible to die of a broken
heart? This question has been on
my mind as I have reflected on the
life, work, and death of former
President, Lyndon B. Johnson. Was
Johnson's bruised and torn heart a
bodily index to far larger bruises
and rippages? As I have often mused
on the strangeness of the death of
Abraham Lincoln on Good Friday,
so I have mused on the strange timing of Mr. Johnson's death, shortly
before the Viet Nam truce was signed.
The direction of the country in the
task of reconstruction certainly took

a different shape after Lincoln's
death. The question about the country's direction after the death of Mr.
Johnson is foremost in the minds of
many in our country. Reconstruction after Lincoln reversed much for
which he had stood and it was carried out without the benefit of the
judgment of his tempered mind. Will
the reconstruction after the Viet
Nam war and Mr. Johnson's death
take a direction against his policies, contrary to the cast of his mind?
Lyndon B. Johnson was a man of
enormous proportions. He seldom
desired or hoped, spoke or planned
in a small way. The same can be said
for his action. His was a restless
energy, coupled with enormous
skill for legislative action and a
network of long cultivated contacts
to insure adequate support for effecting such legislation.
If Mr. Johnson died indeed of a
broken heart it is both wise and compassionate to reflect on his work as
a way to seek understanding about
our own place as a nation and our
own grief. The work of reconstruction after the truce will call for
continued reflection.
The former president loved to
say that he (like every president)
wanted to do the right, but the problem was to know the right. This way
of setting the dilemma is consonant
with desires and hopes so large that
they go beyond human capacity to
perform. This way of stating the
problem of the president (or any
person) reflects the underlying
anxiety of man: the longing to be
right in decisions and policies, in
choices and conduct, both for the
protection of one's own name and
for the benefit of other people,
lies so deep in the human heart
that only that knowledge which approaches omniscience will satisfy
the longing. A person can, of course,
become frivolous and indifferent.
Mr. Johnson could not take that
route. He was caught more and more
by the passion to effect freedom for
every one, especially for those citizens in our country who did not
have freedom or were impotent to
effect it for themselves.
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But I think the issue in choices
mus.t be stated in the opposite way :
the problem in our not doing the
"right" is not that we don't know it
but rather that we do not always
want to do what the right demands
us to do in a given situation. Obviously, in such a statement, there is
the assumption that we do not know
all the answers. Such lack of omniscience, and such curtailment of
the longing to be omniscient, is
precisely the key. The crave for
omniscience is itself one of the evasions of the human heart, an evasion
of the terrible judgment that falls
upon us when we must make a choice.
Choices and Consequences
We have no vacation from making
choices. Our choices, unless they are
revised or interrupted by another
will that changes our will, are always in conformity with our own
nature, our own desires. Similarily,
we have no vacation from the consequences of our choices, unless
one moves into the exchange and
substition of another One for us.
But that is grace, not politics ; that
is mercy, not morality. The consequences of choices about military involvement in Viet Nam pressed Mr.Johnson into a course of action
in which he chose not to make the
either/or choice about the war
and about domestic programs.
In this respect it was not a lack
of knowledge about the right; it
was a choice of wanting the good
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against the good. It was deemed
necessary for the good to continue
the engagement in Viet Nam.
But that "good" in his choice was
hostile to another "good" in the
hopes for domestic action. Such
a course of action involved the
former president in a course of
unwitting deception. That is, it
was not a deception nursed on a
simple meanness to trick people;
but with one "good" set against
another, the deception became a
way of action, where the war could
be neither won nor stopped.
Mr. Johnson's drive to get legislation for the downtrodden, the
poor, the disenfranschised, was
matched with a skill that made it
an unprecedented amount of paper
promises. But the labyrinth of programs, devoid of a policy other
than slogans, fell short of the hopes
it engendered. Hopes, fired by promises that are not kept, and cannot
be kept not because of a malicious
intention that does not want to keep
them, but because they rest on the
presumption of near omnipotence
or omnscience, are the raw material
for heart break. Such grief that
breaks the heart does bring death,
and death brings the hopes crashing
down around it.
There are many people in the
country who sugger from that grief.
In their number are more than his
family and friends. There are also
those who hoped to be the benefactors of his hopes. In fact, the

entire country shows symptoms of
the grief of heart break. Some
frantically want to keep the shattered hopes; others are numb and
stolid; still others keep grabbing
for what little they can get of the
whole; and still others live with an
anger that lies just below a placid
surface.
The days of reconstruction are
going to be as monumental for the
country as they were after the
death of Lincoln. The necessity to
chastise hopes, whether they are
in the form of greed or idealism,
conforming them to the realities
of political, legal, and economic
capabilities so as to rebuild respect
for persons and offices; the skills
to reshape family life in chastity and
fidelity; and the process of reestablishing pride in work along with
a place to work, call for legitimate
grief and for a new course of action.
The healing of the broken heart,
when the resources are in the political, legal, and economic realm,
calls for more discipline on our
desires, more restraint on our
promises, more steadiness in our
service, and the courage to leave
behind the hopes that have deception
built into them.
We should be able to understand
the pain of his broken heart; we
can also share the grief of his family
and friends. But we do better by his
memory when we learn the task of
reconstruction.
0
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THE PRINCES ORGULOUS

HERBERT MEREDITH ORRELL

Nay, if we talk of reason,
Let's shut our gates and sleep.
-Shakespeare's Troilus and

Cressida

In Troilus and Cressida, that strange, puzzling "problem play" which is neither comedy nor tragedy, Shakespeare is dealing with the ways in which a mistaken concept of honor leads to disaster in both the public and
private spheres. "Troilus and Cressida," says David
Horowitz,
presents us with a world in which there is an
unbridgeable gap between fact and value, between
actual human behavior and the principles that
men take to be binding upon their actions. The
play is set in the Trojan War, whose related episodes and myths functioned in the Greek canon
as a kind of Genesis, not least because they engage, as themes, the central values that bind men's
private and public lives. These themes are love
and honor: the one redeems the lust for bodies,
which men share with the beasts, into something
richer and more lasting, and thus "humanizes"
man's intimate relations; the other transforms his
lust for power into service, and thus channels his
brutish energies into avenues of noble actions. 1
As Shakespeare writes in the Prologue,
In Troy there lies the scene. From isles of Greece
The princes orgulous, their high blood chafed,
Have to the port of Athens sent their ship~,
Fraught with the ministers and instruments
of cruel war. Sixty and nine that wore
Their crownets regal from the Athenian bay
Put forth toward Phrygia, and their ww is made
To ransack Troy, within whose strong immures
The ravished Helen, Menelaus' queen
With wanton Paris sleeps, and that's the quarrel. 2

Despite the princes' vows, however, Shakespeare
makes it clear at the outset that, after seven long years,
the war has lost much of its urgency for both sides. The
everlasting bloodshed has become a drag. Love-sick
1. David Horowitz, Shakespeare: An Existential View (New York :
Hill and Wang, 1965) p. 103 .
2. G. B. Harrison, ed., Shakespeare: The Complete Works (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, and World , 1952) p. 973 .

Herbert Meredith Orrell studied at the University of
Pennsylvania and Hofstra University. He received his
BA and MA degrees from the latter institution. He
teaches English composition at Long Island Lutheran
High School.
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Troilus, the Trojan prince, asserting that his passion
for Cressida is more compelling than doing battle, asks
why he should fight "without the walls of Troy/That
find such cruel battle here within," and condemns the
fools on both sides. The tediousness of the war, its lack
of morality and transcendent purpose, have also left
their mark on the Greeks, camped outside the Trojan
walls. Achilles refuses to take up arms, preferring instead to sulk in his tent and make "scurril jests" with
his "masculine whore" Patroclus, while Patroclus enterThe themes are love and honor: the one redeems the lust
for bodies; the other transforms lust for power into service.

tains him by mocking the leadership of Nestor and
Agamemnon. All this the strait-laced Ulysses views with
the utmost gravity. He sees a breakdown of order. To
Ulysses (as to Shakespeare's contemporaries) order and
degree are ordained by the heavens, and when men
violate them chaos ensues. Therefore the riotous
Greeks do not know what they are doing. They have lost
their senses. They extol weaponry over reason and
diplomacy. "The ram that batters down the wall,''
Ulysses complains, "they place before the hand that
made the engine."
Ulysses, it is true, is concerned with order only for
utilitarian reasons; he wishes to use it to tighten discipline. But his famous speech on the hierarchy of
values will, throughout the play, serve as a standard
against which the Trojan misuse of honor is to be viewed
and judged.
It is necessary to remember that the Elizabethans
venerated order and degree. "The Elizabethans regardecl
degree," say Oscar Campbell and Edward Quinn,
as the agent of order at work both in the heavens
and on earth; it most directly represents the unifying power of God binding creation together and
preventing the variable universe from dissolving
back into chaos. Degree creates hierarchy; things
are ordered in terms of degrees of superiority.
Thus, in all classes of existence, natural, human ,
and heavenly, all things that exist are assigned
their rightful places; and in all categories of being can be found innate aristocracy and inherent
inequality.3
3. Oscar Campbell and Edward Quinn , eds., The Reader's Encyclopaedia of Shakespeare (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1966)
p. 179.
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Since all things, all classes of existence, possess degree, therefore, each entity, from the meanest insect to
the angels, has its place in a great chain of being stretching from the earth to the heavens, up to the ens perfectissimum itself. In the state, for instance, justice is
the highest virtue, the virtue around which all other
virtues revolve. In a sixteenth-century woodcut showing
Elizabeth presiding over the spheres of state, justice is
shown as iustitia immobt'le, with its satellite spheres
such as clemency, religion, and fortitude in the outer
orbits, bound together in the gravitational field exerted
by justice. Justice is likened to the sun, the center of the
solar system. Justice is the supreme and all-encompassing virtue. If justice is supreme, then honor must needs
be lower. Honor is contained in justice, but justice cannot possibly be contained in honor, for the simple reason that the lesser cannot contain the higher. There is
an "innate aristocracy" which assigns honor to a lower
degree than justice.
After Ulysses has stated the case for order and degree,
we are in a better position to see why the Trojan idolatrous worship of honor is the pivotal point in the play,
as becomes clear in the debate in the Trojan council
as to whether the war shall be continued.
As he opens the deliberations of his council, King
Priam reveals that the Greeks have offered to call off
the fighting if Helen is restored to them. Hector argues
that inasmuch as the war has already cost a tenth of
Trojan manpower, he can see no reason why Helen
should not be given up. At this point Troilus, roused
from his dream of love with Cressida, flares up and
attacks Hector. "Nay," he says, "if we talk of reason/
Let's shut our gates and sleep. Manhood and honor/
Should have hare hearts, would they but fat their
thoughts/With this crammed reason. Reason and respect/Make livers pale and lustihood deject." (II, ii,
46-50.)
The hierarchy of values serves as a standard by which the
misuse of honor is viewed and judged. For the Elizabethans
"degree creates hierarchy; ..." All things that exist have
their rightful places. In the state, justice is the highest
virtue.

Troilus, then, rejects reason in favor of honor. In
modem parlance we would say he has found his rationale for continuing the war. The rationale is honor. It
is a characteristic response, Hector reproves him, as
one of those unfit to hear moral philosophy. On a more
pragmatic basis, Hector then appeals to Troilus on the
grounds that Helen is not worth what it costs to hold
her. Troilus' rejoinder is that nothing is worth anything
except for the price we put on it. Not so, says Hector;
value lies in intrinsic worth. "'Tis mad idolatry," he
says, "to make the service greater than the god." Having
been bested on this point, Troilus then counters by saying that Helen has been chosen, as a man chooses a wife,
and honor demands that she be kept. "We do not turn
our silks upon the merchant when we have soiled them."
February, 1973

He points out that the Trojans, Hector included, were
quick enough to encourage Paris to capture Helen, so
why do they change their minds now? If Helen was
valuable then, is she any the less valuable now? To
admit guilt at this late date is to confess that the entire
enterprise has been sick from the beginning and that
the Trojan deaths on the battlefield have been meaningless. Honor demands that the war continue.
At this point mad Cassandra bursts in, raving her
prophecies of doom. Hector then asks Troilus whether
Cassandra has not aroused uneasy feelings in him. Or
is reason totally lost on him? Has he thought of the consequences of continuing the war? Troilus replies that
the consequences do not determine the justness of an
act and that Cassandra's brainsick raptures cannot cast
a pall over ventures to which Trojan honor is so deeply
committed. Paris, on his part, says he does not favor
yielding up Helen on terms of "base compulsion." He
considers it a mark of degeneracy even to think about it.
Then follows one of the most disconcerting scenes in
all of Shakespeare. The sagacious Hector, summing up
"If justice is supreme, then honor must needs be lower.
Honor is contained in justice, but justice cannot possibly
be contained in honor, for the simple reason that the lesser
cannot contain the higher."

the debate, says that his brothers' arguments for continuing the war "do more conduce to the hot passion of
distempered blood/Than to make up a free determination/Twixt right and wrong." Morality, he points out,
obliges the Trojans to return Helen to her husband
Menelaus. To persist in wrongdoing aggravates the
offense, rather than lessens it. The longer the war continues, the more immoral it becomes. Nevertheless,
Hector's final decision is to go along with his brothers
and keep Helen because, as he says, "'Tis a cause that
hath no mean dependence/Upon our joint and several
dignities."
And so Hector, after citing all the arguments for discontinuing the war, chooses to continue it. Trojan honor
weighs more than justice or morality. After a long period of apathy and cynicism, it is honor, not justice,
which galvanizes the warriors into action. Hector's
capitulation is hailed by Troilus as evidence that Hector has finally seen the light. "She fHelen] is a theme of
honor and renown," Troilus says, "a spur to valiant and
magnanimous deeds." (II, ii, 199-200.)
The self-deception among the princes orgulous,
reaching downward, has malignant consequences on
the fortunes of Troilus and Cressida, as the private
tragedy of the two lovers will later affect the conduct
of the war. By a decision at the highest levels, Cressida,
after a single night of lovemaking, is wrenched from
Troilus' arms and deposited in the Greek camp in exchange for the Trojan Antenor held captive by the
Greeks. The lovers have no say in the matter; it is a
question of polity. The Greeks owe a favor to Calchas,
Cressida's father, who has defected to them, and the
7

Trojans are only too glad to get Antenor back at so
cheap a price. At the Greek camp, Cressida, in a scene
often cited as an example of her incorrigible wantonness, is free and bold with the Greek warriors, allowing
them to kiss and fondle her and eliciting Ulysses' condemnation of her as a born harlot,
Fie upon her!
There's language in her eye, her cheek, her lip Nay, her foot speaks, her wanton spirits look out
At every joint and motive of her body.
(IV, v, 54-57.)

Despite Ulysses' reproof, the important question is
not whether Cressida is or is not a wanton but whether
her trifling with the Greeks is in any way related to the
Trojan council's trifling with reason. Although it is
Agamemnon to whom Ulysses refers when in his speech
on degree he says,
When that the general is not like the hive
To whom the foragers shall all repair,
What honey is expected? (I, iii, 81-8.1.)

he might just as well have referred to Hector. What
honey is expected when the people lack wise leadership?
When rulers stoop to folly, so do the ruled. The "specialty of rule" has been neglected not only among the
Greeks, it seems, but among the Trojans as well, for it
is the responsibility of princes not only to rule but to
rule wisely.
As for Cressida, she has little cause to be happy, or,
for that matter, to be true to Troilus. Separated from
Troilus by a decree of state (a decree, by the way, which
Troilus does nothing to counter), friendless, without
protector among a people who for many years have laid
siege to her city, Cressida is a displaced person, a casualty of war, and if she seems immoral or cynical it is
because Shakespeare wishes us to understand that when
public morality breaks down there is no private morality either.
Through the results of a trade, in other words, Cressida is made an enemy of her homeland. Her loyalty is
now to be pledged to the Greek cause, and her erstwhile lover, Troilus, is now her foe. Neither at this
point can have a moral claim on the other. Through
Troilus' stubborn refusal to consider the consequences
of continuing the war, the two lovers are divided more
effectively than East German is divided from West
German. "One of the morally intolerable aspects of war,"
says John C. Bennett, "is that it not only turns people
into destroyers of their neighbors on the other side of
a conflict but in many other ways renders impossible
truthful human communication and personal relationships. 4
The ignominy which had taken place in the public
sphere, during the Trojan debate on whether the war
should be continued, is now to be duplicated in the pri4. John C. Bennett, Fore(irn Policy in Chn.stian Perspective (New
York: Charles Scribner's, 1965) p. 24.

8

vate sphere. That is to say, the betrayal of reason is to
have its correlative in the betrayal of love. Not a single
night passes in the Greek camp before Diomed, Cressida's self-appointed protector, is laying siege to her.
Although Cressida strives to be true to Troilus ("Tempt
me no more to folly," she pleads), Diomed is fully aware
of what has gone on between her and Troilus and he is
in no mood for dissembling or coyness.
After spying on the harrowing exchange between his
mistress and the Greek Diomed, Troilus is so deeply
shaken that he cannot believe his eyes. Could the woman
who pledged fealty to him only hours earlier now so
crassly betray him? Is it really Cressida he has seen?
"This she?" he inquires in torment. "No, this is Diomed's
Cressida." And that is exactly the point. Victimized by
a decision over which she has had nothing to say, Cressida, her integrity broken, is no longer herself. She has
been sold, as it were, to Diomed. Her pledge to Troilus
crumbles against the threat of an empty universe, just
as reason had already crumbled against a spurious
concept of honor. In a world torn by strife and turmoil
-worse, in a world lacking an overarching principle
to bind it together, a world governed not by design but
by caprice-one casts about desperately for security.
Since there is nothing certain in life, it does not matter
how one behaves, since values are but sham and pretense. As Troilus and Cressida are driven apart, so
reason and madness are brought together as though they
were one. In a world where men's actions are consonant
with their expressed loyalty to principles of conduct,
reason and madness are as far apart as heaven and earth.
But by the acts of orgulous men reason and madness
have been wedged together so tight that nothing can be
driven between them.
One of the ironies in a play that is replete with ironies
is that Cressida's seduction by Diomed makes Troilus
an agonized voyeur at the scene of his beloved's faithlessness. What Shakespeare is doing in this scene is
showing that when folly destroys the civil faculty by
which men should be governed, nothing is sacred. All
things suffer when men make the service greater than
the god. It is one of the achievements of this extraordinary play that the private and the public have been so
skillfully interwoven that only Anthony and Cleopatra,
of all the plays, seems of equal subtlety.
The ignominy which had taken place in the public sphere
inevitably continues in the private sphere. The betrayal
of reason is to have its correlative in the betrayal of love.

The seduction of Cressida by Diomed goes to the very
heart of Shakespeare's play. In it the poet shows what
happens when the hierarchy of degree has been violated and chaos takes over. For the full significance of
Cressida's submission to Diomed, it must be played in
the open , as it were, it must be subjected to a blanching,
pitiless light. In the good society some things ought to
be kept private, and sexual intimacy is one of them.
Instead, when community is destroyed , even the closest
The Cresset
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relationship can claim no sanctity and the exchange
between Diomed and Cressida becomes a public business, publicly witnessed and degraded to the level of
the market place.
Put another way, the private. takes on the worst characteristics of the public, and the good is betrayed in the
same way it has been betrayed already in the public
sphere. Cressida's pledge of loyalty is broken not because Cressida is a cold-hearted, concupiscent bitch,
but because pledges of loyalty are weak reeds when selfdeception and delusion become the controlling elements in the social order. As reason was betrayed in the
open, for all to see, so will love be betrayed in the same
way. Therefore Cressida's sordid pact with Diomed is
witnessed not only by Troilus and Ulysses, both of
whom comment on the action as it unfolds, but also by
Thersites, Shakespeare's most scurrilous character,
who comments derisively on the comments. Finally,
filtered through the prism of all three, it is viewed by

mentary of mockery and derision. "War and lechery!
Nothing else holds fashion!"
Parallels between Troilus and Cressida and the war
in Southeast Asia would not be hard to find. Americans
have claimed they wanted and now announce a peace
with honor. But was honor abstracted from its dependence on higher values and made into an end? Only if
justice is paramount can there be an honorable peace.
The function of honor, as Horowitz says, is to transform
lust for power into service. Honor must labor for an
end higher than itself or we come to resemble the princes
orgulous in Shakespeare's play.
0

In the exchange between Diomed and Cressida it is shown
that the private sphere takes on the worst characteristic
of the public, and the good is betrayed in the same way it
has been betrayed already in the public sphere.

the audience itself. The total effect is like a closed
loop of common complicity in evil. It would be difficult for the hardiest relationship to survive exposure
of this kind, and Cressida's relationship with Troilus
has been none too pure to begin with. Thus the human
community, the purpose of which ought to be to unify
men and mitigate their follies , is travestied into a mocking chorus of the rupture of community.
In this dark, bitter play Shakespeare is saying that
honor cannot redeem a war which is essentially dishonorable. When honor is true to itself it functions to raise
appetite from a brutish level to a human level. Honor
does for appetite and thirst for power what love does
for lust. But to do this honor must be in the service of
a higher good. Without these overriding controls,
humanity will prey on itself. Even love cannot know
itself when reason and restraint have given way to
irrationality. Because the Trojan War is no longer a
war to free the captive, to bring about justice, to right
a wrong or redress a grievance- basically, because it
has none of the attributes of a "just" war-men fall into
error when they attempt to equate it with honor. Thus
the princes orgulous bring about the downfall not only
of themselves but of others.
In Troilus and Cressida the violation of degree leads
to the loss of a world. The destruction of the good society is multi-dimensional. The princes orgulous are
driven by self-deception, not by reasoned judgment,
and, not unexpectedly, their choices are not those of
men who understand the workings of the cosmic order.
With poetic justice Hector, the epitome of honor, is
dishonorably slain by Achilles, and Troilus, the romantic lover, is turned into a wild animal running berserk.
And Thersites presides over the wreckage with a comFebruary, 1973

The Street of Make-Believe

I see the street below from my dusty window,
The Streetchildren playing lullabys,
And the lady with flowers in her soul,
Selling her body for a dozen rosebuds.
A Joker is led in processions of black,
As his partner rides the wheels of a hearse,
And no one knows that no game remains,
Yet they sweat red, red wine that everybody drinks,
And sing simple song~ that everybody knows .
Fairy Princess glides by on her chariot of gold,
Piping dreams through her turned up nose,
And bargains with toothless Potato Sellers for pennies.
Paper Sellers of news for display,
Riddle rhymes, making death seem unreal;
While the Voyeur pulls a dime from his well-trodden purse,
And undresses the lady in the comics.
And no one's eye catches the White-Tight Man,
Playing himself in tune to the children's songs.
And no one spies the sun's monotony forsaken by the stars,
And the night stumbling forth to cover the cries
Of the Children, the Fairies, the Whores.
LeEta Barber
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Now when Jesus came, he found that Lazarus had already been in the tomb four days. Bethany was near
Jerusalem, about two miles off, and many of the Jews
had come to Martha and Mary to console them concerning their brother. When Martha heard that Jesus was
coming, she went and met him, while Mary sat in the
house. Martha said to Jesus, ''Lord, if you had been
here, my brother would not have died. And even now I
know that whatever you ask from God, God will give
you." Jesus said to her, "Your brother will rise again."
Martha said to him, "I know that he will rise again in
the resurrection at the last day." Jesus said to her, "I
am the resurrection and the life, he who believes in me,
though he die, yet shall he live, and whoever lives and
believes in me shall never die. Do you believe this?"
She said to him, "Yes, Lord; I believe that you are the
Christ, the Son of God, he who is coming into the world. "
John 11:17-27
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God Has a Better Idea

WALTER E. KELLER
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You're watching TV, enjoying one of your favorite
programs. There for the umpteenth time is still another
pause for a message, which you know very well means
at least four commercials. There's the humorous one,
and you can tolerate that one. It's as though the advertiser has a silent understanding with you that it really
is all rather silly, but we may as well all get a laugh out
of it. Then there's the deadly serious one, complete with
The Cresset

quasi-scientific jargon and doctors' recommendations
that there is nothing better to relieve your pain and tension than "our" brand of aspirin. And so through the
dreary parade of toothpastes and razor blades, automobiles and bras. Maybe it is true that we Americans are
victims of an endless list of aches and pains, insecurities
and deprivations. Those are easy enough to identify
and identify with. But that they should all have such
easy cures? And always basically the same one! It's never
Brand X; it's always "our" product! Buick may be something to believe in, but the land of TV commercials has
already made skeptics of us all .
And so you're set up for the kill. Along comes another
one, spoken almost convincingly against the visual
background of fun and daring adventure: You only go
around once in life, so you've got to grab all the gusto
you can. Well, maybe you don't go out immediately and
buy a six-pack of Schlitz, but you do buy in on that
message-or at least you're tempted to. What could be
"It looks at first like a gospel, some good news, but it turns

sour very quickly. For it says that you can count all your
tomorrows on the fingers of one hand and then the tomorrows run out."

more relevant to the technological age of leisure than
such a cool gospel. Go around once in life - grab all the
gusto you can. Such advice puts aches and pains in perspective, fortifies us in our insecurities, and teaches us
that we need not be totally deprived.
Of course, even high school students know that this
"you-only-go-around-once-in-life-so-grab-all-the-gustoyou-can" bit is today's counterpart of the ancient hedonistic maxim: Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we
die! And by the time you've studied in college even for
a while, you have learned to see that such an attitude,
while initially attractive, is really an expression of
, deep despair. It looks at first like a gospel, some good
news, but it turns sour very quickly. For it says that you
can count all your tomorrows on the fingers of one hand
and then the tommorows run out. It says that what you
are doing really leads nowhere finally, that soon we all
run into a stubbornly unyielding brick wall, and when
that happens you've had it, and it's all over. And if that's
the case, you may as well enjoy the one shot you've got
at grabbing a bit of gusto-Schlitz or otherwise. If that
be gospel, it's pretty grim news.
For some time now a style of theology has enjoyed
quite a vogue. It was - and still is- a type of theology
which belittled traditional Christian theology for its
accel)t on death and the resurrection life hereafter. It
accused such preaching of not being serious about the
here and now, of too easily providing an escape from
present responsibilities and cares. And there was a lot
of justification for such criticism. The person who looks
February, 1973

only toward heaven will not only miss the genuine joys
on earth, but will also ignore the earthly plight of his
neighbor. So there developed a whole host of "here-andnow" theologies, which tried to sing a "the future is
irrelevant, the present is where the action is" song.
These excesses may have run their course, for now there
are many voices calling for a more sober and balanced
view.
Christian people have every opportunity for realistic expectations and joyful faith, both for life here and
life hereafter. Death is a grim reality- and more. It
is a menacing and heartless tyrant. The knight in Ingmar Bergman's Seventh Seal discovered that you cannot
win at chess with Death; he always checkmates you.
Death ends life and thereby calls it severely into question. It's shadow darkens our joys and clouds our perception of life's meaning. There is good reason for being a gusto-grabber, if death indeed has the final, irrevocable word.
You cannot win at chess with Death. He always checkmates you. But Christ's death and resurrection for you
means that when Death checkmates you, you have God's
promise of a final, eternal tomorrow.

The widow at Zarepheth, however, learned differently. Drought and famine were Death's scepter and
crown in the days of Elijah, yet God stayed death's
hand. And when Death did claim her son's life, God
revealed His power to overcome the otherwise unchallenged sway of Death's might. Through his prophet
Elijah he restored her son to life. And this was but the
sign of yet greater things to come. For God sent his Son
Jesus Christ to die for our sins according to ancient
Scripture, as St. Paul testifies; he was buried, and on the
third day God raised him up again. The power of death
is so invincible, because death is God's own sentence
upon our forfeit lives. We therefore dread death with
good reason. The really good news is that we need no
longer fear even death, for Christ died for us, broke
death's power and was raised to life everlasting. Death
does not have the last word; God's last and decisive
Word is embodied in our risen Lord Christ. You are set
free to overcome death by following him through death
to resurrection life. That means that on your deathbed,
when Death checkmates you, you have God's promise of
a final, eternal tomorrow. And that prospect makes all
the difference in this world, here and now. That's what
Jesus was getting at in his word to Martha: he who believes in me, even though he dies, yet shall he live. And
whoever lives and believes in me shall never really die.
We don't have to create our own lives; they are given to
us, through Jesus, the Resurrection and the Life. We are
liberated to pass it along, to share it. In short, we are
freed from panicky, frenzied gusto-grabbing. You see,
God really has a better idea.
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A DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.

By Paul W. Pruyser,
Harper & Row, New York, 1968. $10.00.

THE EDITOR HAS REQUESTED A "PERIPATETIC" REVIEW. I interpret this as the
assignment to select a book that I frequently
think about while I am walking around: a book
that improves with rereading and that seems even
more important to me now than when I first read
it. This is such a book. Having lived with it for
more than four years, I find it increasingly interesting and stimulating. And it has repeatedly
provided me with conceptual tools and a frame
of reference that have greatly facilitated my own
thinking about the relationship between theology and psychology. I choose it for review at
this time because I feel that many of our readers
may not yet be familiar with it and with the hope
that it will prove as helpful and stimulating to them
as it has been to me.
In this essay, I shall attempt: l) to describe some
of the more significant features of this book; 2)
to make some comments on its structure that may
help the reader find his way into it more quickly;
and 3) to report on ways in which I have found
Pruyser's method useful and stimulating in my
own thinking. I shall not attempt to summarize
the general content of the book; rather I shall
consider this review to have achieved its purpose
if it motivates the reader to read Pruyser for himself.
Paul Pruyser is a clinical psychologist at The
Robert C. Schultz is a professor in the Department
of Theology, Valparaiso University. The editor
has asked the review editors for theological and
general books to present once each year a "peripatetic" review, a treatment of a book (or books)
which has engaged their attention and shaped their
thinking. Dr. Schultz's is the first offering to readers of The Cresset.
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A Theologian's Use of a
Psychological System

Menninger Foundation. From this psychoanalytic perspective he brings special insight into the
nature of religion as a problem-solving process
as well as into the role of conflict in religion. For
many, the association with psychoanalysis will
recall encounters with analysts who were in principle opposed to religion. However, as Pruyser
points out, Freud's basic description of religion
as an "illusion" does not presuppose the truth or
the falsehood of any specific religious belief. And
Pruyser's own work demonstrates that the use of
psychoanalytic insights and techniques in studying psychological dimensions of religious beliefs
does not necessarily result in a negative attitude
toward religion (e.g. pp. 7-8; 324-328).
This work has furnished me with conceptual tools
and a frame of reference that have greatly facilitated my own thinking about the relationship between
theology and psychology."

Pruyser's book is important because it shows
how we can use a psychological frame of reference
to separate theology and the psychology of religion
from each other. This enables us to evaluate each
independently without either denying their coincidence in experience or transgressing on their
integrity. Theology - and particulary Lutheran
theology - has been struggling with this task for
a long time. Eighteenth century Pietists are good
examples of the results of establishing psychological patterns of religious experience as the basic
criteria of theological truth. Ludwig Feuerbach
reversed the process in the nineteenth century.
He used Luther's theology as the primary example
of his assertion that theological statements are
simply the projection of subjective human needs
on to a non-existent God. And in the present,
Erik Erikson's Young Man Luther - or John
Osborne's inadequate version of it in his play
Luther-have caused many to ask if we can be
Lutherans unless we have bowels like Luther or
at least recapitulate his psychological experience.
Questions such as these require us to separate the
psychology of religious experience from the whole
The Cresset

question of its religious truth. Pruyser can help us
do that.
Seward Hiltner has described Pruyser's book
as breaking "new ground in the same sense as did
William James' Varieties of Religious Experience."
And one way of describing Pruyser's book is to
point out that he both builds on the conclusions
of James and goes beyond them. He has summarized the basic conclusions reached by James :
He [James] made some excellent propositions:
(a) that religious phenomena are continuous
with other psychic phenomena; (b) that in religion as everywhere else, the sublime and
the ridiculous are two poles of a continuum
with many ordinary, drab and hackneyed happenings in between; (c) that in religion, as in
other human endeavors, feelings tend to be
more important than thoughts; (d) that there
is not one single psychic wellspring for religion in the form of a special instinct, sentiment, or disposition; (e) that religion has a
human and a divine side and that psychology
can study only the former; and (f) that people
do not simply have a God but that they use
their God and that religion is known by its
fruits in behavior (p. 3).

Pruyser accepts these six basic conclusions. He
also suggests that points (d) and (f) above deserve
to be taken even more seriously than James did.
Pruyser points out that we now know a great deal
more about how people use their gods than James
was able to know. Those who find the idea of people using their gods a bit strance are reminded
that this concept is not too far removed from
Luther's discussion of what it means to have a god
(Large Catechism, First Commandment). There
Luther defines a man's god as whatever he sees
as his source of all good and his help in all time
of trouble. And as Luther's explanation of the
commandments indicates, there is a distinct relationship between the gods we fear, love, and
trust and our behavior.
Pruyser also agrees with James' fourth assertion that all psychological processes (for example,
the senses, thinking, feeling, etc.) may participate
in religious experience. However, James was not
able to move beyond this to a discussion of the
"holistic, integrative character" of religion. Pruyser
suggests that a~ a result:
Since James, the term "religious experience"
has become an expression for a somewhat
cagey way of dealing with certain aspects of
the psychology of religion. Its premises seem
to be: (a) some people have subjective experiences, of one sort or another called "religious";
(b) psychology, as an empirical science, deals
with the experiences of people; therefore,
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the psychology of religion, if it is to be
empirical, deals with the subjective experiences of people called religious (p. 4).

(c)

Pruyser does not find anything wrong with this
common approach to religious experience except
that it is too narrow. Its one-sided concentration
on feelings "cuts down on the importance of cognitive states, decisions, and acts - on the very things
in which systematic and moral theology is interested."
This limited focus of the James school makes
it all too easy to describe the capacity for religious
experience as limited to certain people rather than
as part of the common human experience. It also
encourages a preoccupation with neurotic and psychotic forms of religious experience rather than
with religious experience as a normal healthy part
of human life. In contrast, Pruyser (p.19) proposes to address two basic questions to the whole
range of human experience: 'Which are the significant data of religious experience (and thus
a sure ground for the psychology of religion)?
and, Which data of experience are of religious
significance (and thus an imaginative challenge
to the psychology of religion)?"
One result of these two questions is that the
reader cannot assume that he is dealing with material outside himself. Our own experience becomes a part of the data and we cannot study the
psychology of religion without simultaneously
examining and revealing the psychological dimensions of our own religious experience.
Some implications of this broader focus can be
seen if we compare key words in the chapter titles
used by James and Pruyser. James' categories are
quite religious: "The Reality of the Unseen";
"The Religion of Healthy-mindedness"; "The
Sick Soul"; "The Divided Self"; "Conversion";
"Saintliness"; "Mysticism"; "Philosophy." Pruyser
on the other hand uses psychological categories:
He devotes six chapters to perceptual processes,
intellectual processes, thought organization, linguistic functions, emotional processes, and the
-motor system. All these categories provide perspectives for the identification and examination
of the data of religious experience. These are
followed by three chapters in which Pruyser discusses the integrative processes in religion in terms
of relations to persons, to things and ideas, and
to the self. Pruyser's basic perspective is so psychologically oriented that the same outline could
be applied to other areas of life by simply changing the word "religion" to its appropriate counterpart. In addition, Pruyser can deal with his material without attempting any definition of religion other than Rudolf Otto's The Idea of the Holy.
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Even the definition of religion in the last chapter
remains open-ended.
HAVING MADE THIS TRANSITION TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL CATEGORIES, Pruyser
presents a psychology of religion quite different
from that familiar to most oi us.· He identifies it
as a "dynamic" psychology of religion. And an
understanding of his book depends on remaining
aware of this transition to a dynamic approach and
a persistent focus on its implications. This is one
of Pruyser's major contributions to the subject.
I therefore recommend that the reader give careful attention to the "orientation" to the subject
in Chapter I and supplement this with a rather
careful study of the material on pp. 201-208, before
plunging ahead into Chapter II. In this way he
will have a much clearer sense of the scope of the
book. The reader's attention is particularly drawn
to the discussion of the relationship between "part"
and "integrative" processes and to the role of the
person, or ego, in relationship to both.
Pruyser's distinction between "part" and "integrative" processes is based on a structural model
of personal functioning. Two kinds of demands
are made on the ego, or person. Some demands
are made by the "drives and needs which are derived from a person's basic biological equipment."
Other demands are made by the world outside
the person. In order to survive, the person must
respond and adapt to both kinds of demands, must
keep them in a dynamic balance, and satisfy both
kinds of demands without either retreating from
reality or sacrificing his own integrity.
In short, the part processes of the ego signal
the needs that are felt within, as well as the
opportunities and pressures that are present
outside. In thought or action the synthesizing
capacity of the ego brings person and world
together for the satisfaction of the person's
needs and in respectful homage to the world,
which contains millions of people constituted
just like this person, some of whom may look
at him as "outside world'' and "satisfier" to
their own needs. To the individual, reality contains three large groups of parties with which
transactions must be made. All three groups
are potentially "objects" or "satisfiers" to the
individual's needs. More specifically, all three
are objects of love and objects of hate, in some
proportion. They are: (1) other people; (2)
things and ideas; (3) the self. With all three
the ego must engage .in relations, on the one
hand because these three groups are forcefully
demanding recognition in their own right since
they form the major aspects of reality (p. 206).
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The ego thus serves varying roles in relationship to the "part" and to the "integrative" processes as it strives to maintain a dynamic balance
between the demands of the inner drives and the
reality of the outer world. It selects from the organism's wide range of drives and needs and focuses their demands on the outer world. In this
process, the ego becomes part of the outer reality
which the drives confront in their search for satisfaction. Simultaneously, when the ego itself confronts the outer world it functions as the representative of the inner drives. In this double role,
the ego preserves a high degree of autonomy and
independence. The inner drives preserve its autonomy over against the outer world and the involvement in the outer world preserves the ego's independence of the inner drives. This autonomous
independence is preserved in the very processes
by which the ego serves and is dependent on the
inner drives and on the outer world. The ego's
role alternates between being an agent seeking fulfillment of the drives and being a representative of outer reality setting limits to the
drives.
Once the importance of constant reference to
this model of the dynamic interaction between
the ego and the inner drives (the part processes)
and between the ego and the outer world (the
integrative processes) is recognized, this book
becomes an excellent way of thinking about religion within the context of the.se life processes,
which we confess to be God's good creation. And
attention to the shifting function of the ego makes
it possible for us to identify a variety of forms
of moralism as well as a variety of points of contact between the person and the gospel.
One common form of legalism imposes external
demands on the part processes: certain liturgical styles, emotional experiences, and even styles
of theology are established as the criteria of valid
religious experience. The most common name for
this is "pietism" - but its manifestations are legion.
Such limiting pietisms .become moralistic because
they demand a uniformity as the price of truth,
uniformity which contradicts the richness of God's
good creation. The external world sets artificial
limits on the inner drives and thus robs the ego
of its freedom. The ego is enslaved to certain patterns of worship, of emotional experience, and of
theological thought.
THE CONCLUSIONS IN THE PREVIOUS
PARAGRAPH describe the kind of insights to
which I have been helped by reflection on Pruyser's description of the part-processes in religion
in the light of Lutheran theology. Pruyser describes the broad range of psychological partprocesses which participate in the experience of
worship, especially the perceptive processes. There
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. is no common pattern to the perceptive processes
and thus no common liturgy that will be satisfying
to all. Some require a luxuriant flooding and stimulation of the senses. Others are best served by an
ascetic focus on one of the perceptive senses to
the relative exclusion of others. There is a wide
range of pattern of needs and of acceptable satisfactions - and the church acts legalistically when
it imposes one particular style on all as the only
acceptable form of worship. That recognition has
made it easier for me both to accept the validity
of liturgies which I personally do not find satisfying and to feel quite comfortable about my inability to participate in them.
A similar insight develops out of the careful
analysis of emotional processes in religion. It is
of course a theological truism that the pietistic
demand for certain patterns of emotional experience as the condition of true religion is a form of
legalism or moralism, and emotional works-righteousness. Reading Pruyser has helped me conclude
that, since all the emotional processes can serve
as vehicles of religious expression, any demand
for the exclusion of certain emotional processes
from religious experience as well as any demand
for a single pattern of emotional experience in
religion is a legalist~c demand . On the one hand,
such a demand denies the goodness of God's creation by asserting that certain processes or patterns
of processes are not acceptable to God. On the
other hand, it imposes eternal patterns on the ego
in the name of God which God himself does not
impose. Thus there is nothing more Christian and
less pietistic about the demand for "joy" and
"peace" and dancing in the aisles than there is
about the demand for quiet meditation and gravity, no more virtue in singing loudly than in quietly listening to the choir.
Since my own field is systematic theology, I am
particularly excited by the insights which develop
out of Pruyser's survey of intellectual processes,
thought organization, and linguistic processes in
religion. I can speak as bitterly as anyone about
the legalism of dead orthodoxy, but must confess
that I did not really understand its dynamics.
On the one hand, Pruyser's discussions have
given me a renewed sense of the dynamic importance of doctrine in the life of the religious community. People do think, do organize their
thoughts, and do express them - and the religious
community needs to help its members satisfy these
needs in the context of religious experience in
ways which are satisfying to them. On the other
hand, there is no basis for selecting one style of
thinking, orgamzmg, and expressing one's
thoughts as the only acceptable one - or even
for making it the only one available in the community. That is an externally imposed limitation
February, 1973

which contradicts the freedom of the Christian.
Pruyser's analyses make it clear that various styles
of thinking, various levels of conceptualization
and abstraction, various styles of organizing and
expressing thought are part of the richness of
God's creation. People think in different ways;
some are more literal, others more symbolic; some
by nature think in concrete terms, others are more
imaginative and think in symbolic terms; some use
one type of language, some use another. To impose
one style as the only acceptable one is to impose
a legalistic lifeless orthodoxy which requires slavish conformity.
This suggests the necessity of clearly distinguishing doctrine and theology. And it recommends
the discipline of refraining from controversy unless the doctrinal issue can be clearly identified
and stated in the context of the theologies involved.
For example, Lutherans are generally agreed on
the doctrine of the gospel. The theology in which
that doctrine is stated should be an adiaphron.
Lutherans may theologize in various ways; we
may follow the model of Luther or Melanchthon,
of Quenstedt or Schleiermacher, of Barth or Tillich, etc. Difference of theology does not presume
difference of doctrine. And similarity in theology
ought not obscure doctrinal disagreement. In
practice, however, we often ignore this distinction. Conservative Lutherans often feel closer to
evangelicals and fundamentalists than to fellow
Lutherans who express Lutheran _doctrine in a
different theology. And Lutherans who use a modern type of theology similarly feel more sympathetic
to non-Lutherans who share their theology but
not their doctrine. This leads to bitter controversy among Lutherans in which the doctrinal
issues are not clarified because the real problem
is that one finds the other's theology psychologically unsatisfying. None of this denies the possibility of real doctrinal differences even among
Lutherans. However it would be helpful if we would
practice stating issues in terms of all the theologies
involved in a controversy. Otherwise, we will
eventually fall into the trap of agreeing on or arguing about- theology and ignoring the real
doctrinal issues.

·-

AS A LUTHERAN, THEN, I FOUND PRUYSER'S DISCUSSION of the role of part processes
in religion to be particularly helpful, for example,
in understanding; the dynamics of liturgical, emotional, and theological legalisms. The part processes cannot be assigned integrative tasks; nor
can they be limited by externally imposed _patterns, not even by the person himself.
A second point at which I find Pruyser's work
stimulating arises from reflecting on the dynamic
function of the ego in relationship to the nature
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of sin, and to the working of the law and of the
gospel. If we agree with Paul and Luther that the
law was never given as a way of salvation, then
it follows that the primal experience of man as
creature in relation to God is a relation of trust,
of faith and not of works. Sin then is the condition
in which the ego as representative of outer reality ("Satan") turns on itself and denies the right
of trusting God to itself as the agent of the inner
drives (cf. Romans 7). Once the integration of man
with God is broken through distrust of God , the
basis for the functioning of all the integrative processes, that is, the basis of our relationship to ideas
and things, to other persons, and of course to ourselves, has been damaged or destroyed. It can
only be restored by the recreation of the ego as
the dynamic center of our being. The law then
identifies the breakdown in integration with the
outer world (sin) and heightens the increasing
failure of such an ego to provide adequate satisfaction for the inner drives (sorrow and contri"Reading Pruyser has helped me conclude that since
all the emotional processes can serve as vehicles of
_religious expression, any demand for the exclusion
of certain emotional processes from religious experence as well as any demand for a single pattern of
emotional experience in religion is a legalistic
demand."
tion). The gospel as the power of God is an ongoing dynamic intervention on the part of God
into human life in order to create a new dynamic
center of trust in God (rebirth or the new creation). This new center of trust exists as God's work
independently of the malfunctioning of the other
integrative processes (through faith alone) and
also becomes the source of new integrative processes (works follow faith).
The preceding paragraph is not intended to be
a model for, but an example of the kind of theological thinking which Pruyser's dynamic model
stimulates in me. I find it useful because it helps
me to maintain the continuity between my psychology and my theology, without requiring me
to identify the two. As a theologian, I add an integrative process to Pruyser's list: Relation to
God. Pruyser's psychology of religion is complete
without it because the reality of God is not available for psychological investigation. But my theology is impossible without it. Pruyser's description of the integrative processes provides an essential and necessary point of contact between my
psyhological and my theological understanding
of man without injury to the integrity of each.
A third point at which I find Pruyser's analysis
of the integrative processes helpful develops out
of his discussion of the relation to self in the context of religion (Chapter X). Such a psychological
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analysis indirectly confirms the reality of sin in
human experience. Man's relationship to self is
always anxiety-generating. That anxiety takes
different forms: Sometimes it is experienced as
shame and self-doubt, the inability to accept myself. Sometimes this anxiety appears as the anxiety of guilt and fear/ need of punishment. And
at other times, it is the anxiety generated by my
failure to live up to the ideal which I have set for
myself.
Unfortunately, many theologies and many pastors are able to respond to only one or two types
of experiences with a pertinent formulation of the
gospel. Lutherans sometimes speak only in terms
of justification and overlook the fact that Luther
in formulating the gospel for the common people
in the Small Catechism, chooses to express it. in
terms of redemption. He knew that genuine guilt
is not the most common experience, it requires
far more spiritual growth than · many people
achieve in this life. When we forget this, we offer
a gospel of forgiveness that requires our people
to convert all of their spiritual anxieties into guilt.
If they come with other forms of spiritual anxiety,
such as shame or alienation, they must assume a
foreign mode of expression - just as we once required the English to learn German and now
require the Germans in this country to learn English as the condition of hearing the gospel.
As Pruyser points out, the psychological dynamics of our experience of anxiety in relation
to ourselves change. They are influenced by our
pattern of personality development, as well as
by the dominant spirit of the time and place in
which we live. But each man has his own personal
patterns and mixture. And the church has the capacity for a flexible response to each man. The
gospel in terms of redemption speaks directly to
the experience of our bondage to the "demonic"
forces of life. The gospel as atonement and acceptance speaks to our sense of alienation and to our
shame. The gospel as justification and forgiveness speaks to our guilt and to our perverse need
to punish ourselves. The gospel as conformity
to Christ by sharing in his sonship and in his
servanthood speaks to our failure to live up to our
self-chosen ideal or to reach our self-assigned
goals.
The work has been helpful also in reflecting on the
dynamic fun~tion of the ego in relation to sin, and
to the working of the law and of the gospel.
The pastor who understands correlations such
as these is equipped for flexible response to his
people as individuals. He is not limited to a few
formulas . And because he can respond, he does
not need to be afraid to hear what his people are
The Cresset

really saying. Such a pastor is well on the way to
distinguishing law and gospel in each pastoral
encounter - not merely in the safety of academic
theology but in the real world in which ministry
happens. Luther used to say that the distinction
between law and gospel could be learned only
from the Holy Spirit in the school of experience.

Pruyser is not the Holy Spirit by any means, but
his book is as useful a-p orientation to the school
of religious experiencb as anything I know. As
ministers of that gospel which is God's dynamic
power of salvation (Romans 1), we can only profit
from knowledge of the dynamics of the people to
whom we minister.
D

Alice Is Crying

She stares at her face in the glass,
Surrounded by a thousand lights; blisters.
Backstage, she removes the Masks of Pretend
As Cinderella, Alice in Wonderland ; she whimpers .
The stage is bare as she walks through the curtain,
And stares at the faces; were they ever there; she wonders .
Streetlight, be kind to a face she's created,
Made midnights ago while ten years, aging .
Cry for her moon through the city sneering,
Beg a smile for her Beggar Man , drooling.
Taxi Man, grab her before she dies walking;
Walking into Midnight Symphonies of Nightmares.
She played with professional men of steel and men of milky ways,
Tripping away after the fall ; not long in coming, it never was.
Alone, touching in beds of broken teddies, smiling Dawn ,
Breaking into silver before the sun of dirty yellow; she was pure.
She walks through the park wrestling in the breeze,
In a swing, watching puppies make love, she pretends, it is beautiful.
Spin her a life, Clown Man with your top,
Let her feet never leave the stage playing happy.
Hey, fellow Actor Man, whistle along, touch the air,
Was the kiss too cold, too bad for Alice, too bad , for you.

LeEta Barber

February, 1973
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Francesco Albani , 1578- 1660. Kneeling
Shepherd before Christ , oil on copper ,

Peter Paul Rubens . 1577-1640, The Mirac-,
u/ous Draught of Fishes , ink on paper ,

16 3/ 4 x 12 1/ 2". Chesrow Collection .

18 1/ 2

16 1/ 4". Chesrow Collection .

EPIPHANY IN RENAISSANCE AND BAROQUE ART

From February, 7-28, 1973, the
students and faculty of Valparaiso
University, and the residents of
the surrounding community had
the rare opportunity to live in daily
contact with thirty Renaissance and
Baroque pictures from the collection of Colonel Frank W. Chesrow,
a distinguished Valparaiso Univer- ·
sity alumnus. The subjects of these
pictures were mostly Biblical: the
infant Jesus and his parents; events
in the life of Moses, Joseph, and
David; and pictures of Christ in his
ministry, and of the disciples and
saints. The portrayal of these subjects was not through flat, abstract
symbols, but rather, through illusionist images of the visible world,
a type of imagery new at that time
to mankind. If the word epiphany
means bodily manifestations of
something, these illusionist 'pictures are epiphanies of Biblical
people and events, raising the be-
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holder's consciousness of the idea
that Biblical people physically
existed and Biblical events actually
took place.
But the word epiphany is usually
taken to mean a bodily manifestation not of just anything, but of
deity. Some pictures from the Chesrow collection are also illusionist
portrayals of such epiphanies,
epiphanies of God's power used for
man . In Guercino's David with the
Head of Goliath (cover) a convincingly physical David placed in
a somewhat softly veiled atmospheric setting appears as a tender
youth turning away from the head
of Goliath with an air of some distaste and detachment, almost as
though Goliath's death had happened without David; had happened
by the power of God.
In the impressive Caravaggio
paintings, the physical presence
of an assisting angel in St. Peter

and an Angel (inside cover) and the
arresting light of Christ in St. Paul
in Ecstacy (opposite) are dramatic
illusionist revelations of beneficient
divinity. Finally, in the pictures
reproduced on this pa~e, both Dolci
and Rubens portray the divine
Christ helping man. Dolci portrays
Christ as a self-assured, perfect
human being giving blessings to
lesser men. Rubens portrays Christ
as using his power over nature to
Provide food for men. However, in
contrast to Dolci's portrayal , Ruben's full-bodied and vital Christ
and disciples are also shaped by
the struggle and sweat of raw, imperfect life.
It seems, just from these few fine
examples, that the naturalism of
Renaissance and Baroque art can
achieve illusionist epiphanies of
Biblical events, epiphanies that can
raise the Christian's awareness of
G~d and his powerful acts for man.
The Cresset

Michelangelo da Caravaggio , 1569-1609, The Ecstacy of St. Paul , oil on canvas,27 1/2 x 20 1/ 2". Chesrow Collection .

February, 1973

19

THE CITY - Galen Gockel

PROFESSIONAL CARETAKERS
OF THE POOR

Lucille Turner lives on Chicago's
near west side, a grandmother in her
40's, dependent on public welfare
for her food and public housing
for a place to live. Occasionally
Mrs. Turner attempts to cross the
power gap by explaining her situation to college students or seminarians - the sons and daughters of
the solid suburban burghers wh~se
worn-out land she has inherited.
Her own social analysis leads
her to conclude that "Welfare is
one of the programs designed to
keep other people in power. Without poor people there wouldn't
be millionaires."
Nor, she might have added, would
there be a whole class of people paid
to administer her poverty.
The historical story is familiar.
Once the family or clan was depenent only upon itself. It raised the
food necessary for each member,
provided its own shelter. It cared
for each person during illness, and
when individual tragedies occurred,
help was available. The division
oflabor was based on physical ability,
age, and sex.
To ask whether some of society's
members were "poor" in the earliest of times is to reveal how modern
and Western the term is. Perhaps
food was scarce and the winters uncomfortable. But the problems of
survival were shared by all, and an
individual or group could not have
been identified and set aside as
"poor."
Galen Gockel is Director of the
Urban Studies Program, located
in Chicago. The USP is sponsored
by the Associ'ated Colleges of the
Midwest.
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In time, however, the mastery of
the environment became easier
through technological advances,
and society therefore became differentiated according to the aoil'ity to
control the technology. Power and
wealth flowed to those best equipped
to invent, to communicate, to explore.
No one task could be comprehended by all , nor was it necessary
that this be so. So the number of
tasks needed or wanted to run a
society approached infinity, and
each one became so narrow and obscure as to be invisible or unintelligible, or both.
So the same process which produced the poor and troubled also
generated a category of people
whose initial task it was to work with
and help the poor. The progressive
institutionalization of help has in
recent years given rise to an aspiring profession, social work, and to
a formal organization, the social
welfare agency.
The latter half of the nineteenth
century saw the formation of Charity Organization Societies in major
cities. A historian of social work,
Helen Witmer, observed:
The leading ideas of that organization at the time of its initiation were these: the giving of
doles should be stopped, relief
giving should be coordinated,
. and each applicant for assistance should be carefully studied
to determine what he needed
to put him on his feet. The Char. ity Organization Society's particular part in the work would
be to interview the applicants,
draw up a plan for the treatment

of their social disabilities, and
secure the needed funds from
already established organizations. Historians generally agree
that in this scheme lie the bqinnings of the present .system of
organized social work activities.

But if charity was being organized
into "social work activities," something else was happening among
social workers, a metamorphosis
seen also in other occupations. Professionalization was afoot. The impulse to help was not enough. Educational standards were raised. A
bachelor's degree wouldn't suffice.
The study of human behavior .was
·necessary and this required two
additional years of training in graduate school. By the '60's a truly qualified professional had become a
member of the Academy of Certified Social Workers and was therefore entitled to add "ACSW" behind
her/his name.
Through accrediting activities
and ·educational requirements the
profession exerted control over
channels of recruitment and training, and thereby deterred the entrance of "untrained" workers into
the field. As Henry Meyer (the
University of Michigan School of
Social Work) has put it:
Such restrictiveness is seen at
best as a misguided attempt
to enforce dubious standards
of competence, and at worst
as a simple trade union attempt
to monopolize a labor market.

As the ticket of admission to the
profession became more expensive,
it paid less and less attentio~ to the
Mrs. Turners of society. Social work
in Jane Addams' day viewed its major mission as standing between the
advantaged and the disadvantaged,
protecting the latter from the exploitation of the former. It gave
help where problems were the greatest and resources the least.
But the profession has progressively "abandoned the poor" as
Richard Cloward has put it. There
has been an upward shift in the
class composition of social work
clientele. The middle classes began
The Cresset

to demand their own special brand
of services, which social work was
only too pleased to give as it continued to be concerned over its professional status and prestige.
The dilemma is that there is little
public esteem attached to an occupational group which serves those
generally defined by society as lacking virtue, ambition, money, and
self-reliance. As Cloward puts it
"the search for prestige may have
set in motion pressures to upgrade
our clientele."
Into the vacuum surrounding the
poor rushed a host of public programs of income maintenance. Initially public welfare and other plans
were viewed as short-run solutions
for the deserving poor who, through
no fault of their own were on hard
times.
The result, however, has been a
permanent system of social control

over generations of lives, a source
of despair and dependence, the
only conceivable way of life to millions. The poor are tempted by the
invitation to possess the dominant
life-style, yet kept, like Tantalus,
from acquiring the tangible fruits of
the American environment. A legislature and bureaucracy stipulate a
monthly budget which ensures that
dignity is always just out of reach.
The public system of handling
the poor has remained remarkably
immune to reform. Proposals for
guaranteed incomes, negative income taxes, and the like have been
advanced with vigor by academic
economists, welfare-rightists, presidential candidates, and by Richard
Nixon himself.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan has
chronicled the current president's
:ittempt to overhaul welfare in his

The Politics ofa Guaranteed Income.
The system's implacable resistance
to change has many roots. But most
interesting is Moynihan's observation that the most conservative voice
heard in defense of the existing arrangement was that of the welfare
lobby itself. Deeply entrenched in
state, local, and federal offices, the
welfare industry fought desperately to maintain the current structure
of social welfare and, Moynihan
suggests, their jobs.

Lucille Turner may not have studied economics, read Theobald, or
reviewed Moynihan. But when she
points out, on behalf of her sisters
and brothers, that their condition
keeps others powerful, she also reminds us that the view from the bottom can be more precise than we
sometimes suppose.
D

WINTER HAIKU

Snowfall in the night . ...

Flickering candle .. . .

Covers earth's

Reflects on

sleeping bosom . ...

frosty window . . ..

Is the blanket warm?

Thousand icy flames .
Bird, feathery ball ....
Why do you fluff
yourself up?
Oh, to warm your feet!

Snowstorm in the night ....

Round frosty window ....

On the bare and

In the chill, black

sleeping shrubs . .. .

wall of night ....

Behold! white blossoms.

Full moon looking through .
Garden full of birds ....
From just a handful!
of seeds . ...
Feathery fl.o wers.

Snow falling this night ....

Freezing rain last night ....

These tiny bits

Today, sunlight

of moonlight .. . .

on the trees .. . .

Melting on my face .

February, 1973

Jack A. Hlhr

A crystal forest.
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WALTER E. KELLER

NECESSARY AND RELEVANT
TO WHAT?

Mr. Rein's reply to my cnhque
of Dr. Preus' Statement suffers from
a double weakness. In the first place,
he either failed to understand or
carelessly read my critique; and,
secondly, his own counter-proposal
shares the same weaknesses of the
Statement he undertakes to defend.
The purpose of Scripture (to make
men wise unto salvation through
faith in Jesus Christ) may not serve
as a license, he asserts in echo of
the Statement, to question or deny
the historicity of biblical events.
I was not aware that I had done so,
nor do I know any LC-MS theologian
who in the name of the Gospel presumes to raise a question regarding
the historicity of biblical events.
The fact of the matter is that the
debate about the historicity of certain biblical eventS is a given of
today's theological climate. In its
modern form it was raised by the
Enlightenment in a denial of the
Gospel that masqueraded under a
variety of rationalistic guises. Once
the question is raised, however, it
cannot be silenced simply by calling
attention to its bastard birth. It requires an answer. Were Adam and
Eve genuine historical people, and
Walter E. Keller, chairman of the
Department of Theology, Valparaiso
University, wrote ''.A Scrutiny of a
Statement on Scripture, "TheCresset,
June, 1972. In January, 1973, The
Cresset published an article by
Steven A. Hein, "'.A Scrutiny' Scrutinized," in which issue was taken
with Dr. Keller 's article. The editor
asked Dr. Keller to respond to Mr.
Hein '.5 article.
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was the fall a datable event of the
past? Did Jesus really rise from the
dead? It was as a contribution toward
an answer to that question that I
invoked the Lutheran distinction
(not dialectic, as I was consistently
quoted) between the Law and the
Gospel.

The claim for the necessary
historicity of Adam and
Eve · significantly alters
the question of historicity.
.Dr. Keller asks those who
press this claim to show
the source of this necessity and the end such necessity serves.
As I pointed out in my original
article, however, the question of
historicity has been significantly
altered by the Statement of Dr.
Preus. For it is not simply the question, "Were Adam and Eve historical?" but, "Must they be regarded
as having been historical?" As I
further pointed out in my original
article, the distinction between the
Law and the Gospel does not answer
the first question; it helps considerably with the second. What leads to
that conclusion?
If we are going to maintain that
Adam and Eve were in fact historical people, then we shall have to
supply historical verification.
But to accept that burden of proof
implies the prior judgment that the
matter is sufficiently important to
warrant the considerable effort to do

so, in the ·face of the cumulativ~
evidence to the contrary supplied
by literary analyses and comparative
religious factors. What makes that
effort worthwhile? What value is
being protected?
I have suggested that this particular issue has become a case study ·
for the reiiability generally of the
Scriptures as the Word of God, with
the concept of reliability now nuanced toward guaranteeing the
historicity of Adam and Eve. Adam
and Eve were historical because the
Word of God says so, and therefore
it must be so. Their historicity is
important not so much for Adam and
Eve, but for the reliability of the ·
Scriptures generally, for if it should
prove historically unreliable at this
point, then we have no assurance
that it will be historically reliable
where admittedly it counts in a
primary way. The unspoken premise
· of LC-MS piety is that Adam and
Eve must have been historical for
the sake of the reliability of the
Scriptures, for the reliability of
the Scripture provides the foundation for faith in Jesus Christ. Put
in simplest terms, my faith in Jesus
Christ is undermined if Adam and
Eve are not regarded as being literal
historical persons.
I cannot say that the distinctionbetween the Law and the Gospel will
answer the question as to whether
Adam and Eve were historical,
but that distinction releases me from
the burden of having to say that
Adam and Eve must have been historical. They may have been; from
the viewpoint of the distinction
between the Law and the Gospel
the question of their historicity is
an indifferent matter.
Mr. Hein charges me with postulating unscriptural a priori theological opinions. Nothing could be
farther from the truth. He evidently
did not notice the numerous scriptural allusions in my article. Let me
make them explicit. It is not just
"somehow" that "an historical event
must ground the Gospel"; that is the
uniform witness of the New Testament, most explicitly in 1 Cor. 15:
The Cresset

14-17. No comparable insistence can
be found in the Bible upon the historicity of Adam and Eve. That man
is the crown of God's creation is
frequently affirmed in the Bible
without any grounding in Gen .
1-3, as for example in Psalms 8 and
139. That man is a fallen creature
and under God's condemnation is
the running testimony of the Bible
quite apart from Adam and Eve's
fall; indeed, St. Paul grounds man's
culpability in God's continuing disclosure of His power and deity and
men's persistent perversity in exchanging the worship of the Creator
for service to a creature, Rom, 1:18 ff.
Mr. Hein is correct in quoting the
Lutheran Confessions' assertion that
"the chief articles of our Christian
faith constrain and compel us to
maintain a distinction" between man
as God's good creation and man as
fallen creature. He errs in appealing to 16th century historical assumptions as a valid reply to 20th century
questions. Perhaps his a prioris
are showing. Luther can say with all
of Christendom that God has made
me, and that he has redeemed me, a
lost and condemned creature, without once linking my creation and
fall to Adam's and Eve's.

Mr. Rein's defense of Dr. Preus'
Statement shares in the weakness
of that study document. If the unspoken premise is that Adam and
Eve must have been historical to insure the reliability of the Scriptures
as a foundation for faith in Jesus
Christ, then there has been a shift
in the theological center of gravity.
It interprets the attack upon faith 's
certainty as deriving from our inability to have certain historical
knowledge. That is not only a species
of rationalism , but it also sidesteps
the more central issue of alternative beliefs as the masks of unbelief.
That would also explain why he
assigns the task of upholding faith
to a foundation that in the last resort cannot sustain it, and that moreover bypasses the foundation of faith
recommended by the very Bible
under discussion; namely, the proFebruary, 1973

clamation of the Gospel of Jesus
Christ for salvation through fai~'1
in him alone : 1 Cor. 2:2; 1 Cor. 3:11;
2 Cor. 11 :4; Gal. 1:6-9; Luke 10:4142 ; 2 Tim. 3:15 and 16.
Mr. Hein is curiously silent on the
principal challenge I addressed in
my original article. Dr. Preus'
Statement clearly rejects the view
that the Gospel makes the historicity of Adam and Eve irrelevant.
Positively stated, their historicity
is relevant. But to what is it relevant? And why? And how? These
are the hard theological questions,
and they receive no hint of an
answer, either in Dr. Preus' Statement or in its defense by his young
protege.
O

THEATER - - WALTER SORELL

Creativity
Or Other Business
The question is one of The Creation and creativity. It is not easy to
filch a spark from the Creator and
ignite a thought, a theme, a scene.
The propelling momentum may be
there. But many elusive, intangible
elements have to be conjured up,
parts must become a coherent entity,
ecstatic gestures of Dionysian intensity must find their way into a

form-fulfilled frame in order to
give dramatic and poetic Gestalt to
whatever we want to create. That
things may go wrong in our creative
enthusiasm is a foregone conclusion.
It is a truism to refer to every creator's right to fail.
Arthur Miller, intrigued by the
failure in the Genesis of the Creation, apparently wanted to find out
all the reasons for its having gone
wrong and who is really to be blamed
for it. In trying to find' a solution to
this eternally puzzling problem, he
wrote a play which he called The
Creation of the World and Other
Business. In doing so he himself
failed. The reason for his failure· is
already revealed by the choice of
the title which has a nonchalant,
folksy tone with a tinge of irony,
prom1smg anything from cute
to diverting entertainment. It was
that other business that worried me
before the curtain went up. That
phrase has a Neil Simonic touch to
it, and it indicated that the otherwise
serious-minded, often pontifical
author went on an excursion into
the comic. The way this play was
presented seemed to brush the burlesque.
I am always on edge when a program bill announces the appearance
of God, Lucifer, a trio of angels,
and a quartet of the most famous,
and often referred to, first cast of
our tragic beginning. Most playwrights feel somehow awed by, and
uncomfortable with, putting God on
stage. Since we were created in his
image, they feel justified to have God
appear in our image, and by giving
him human shape they escape info
a folksy visualization. To assume a
comic, childlike stance, however, is
no guarantee for overcoming the
feared embarrassment.
The Green Pastures was rather
successful in bringing God and the
other business on stage because it
was done in the pre-nuclear era, and
Marc Connelly chose the setting of
Negro folklore and the atmosphere
of the blues. Today, I suppose, it
might be taken as an insult to the
black race. Clifford Odets' The
Flowering Peach came very close to
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being a failure with its weak second
act. The story of the Biblical Noah
is told in the idiom of the New York
Jewish middle-class. There, jargon
and the Jewish folksy atmosphere
were consistent. Either you accepted
it, or you remained in a state of
unease.
This unease was predominant in
Miller's play which strained for
humor. Like a bankrupt comedian,
Miller threw in a few jarring Yiddish
words, such as Nebbich. When, after
God's command to leave the Paradise, an argument arose, it was
settled with the remark: "He said
it in plain Hebrew!" When Lucifer
visits Adam and Eve again, he looks
around and says: "Every time I
come up here they've got more
junk." Still in Paradise there are
several jokes of high school calibre,
mainly referring to sex. The worst
and most childish fun was Eve's
question, while pointing at Adam's
penis, whether this will still grow on
her. There was much more humor
in Miller's The Price, and it was
quite effective because it emerged
from within the character. Here,
the humor sounded artificial, unMillerish.
There was much kitsch in the setting of Boris Aronson who is a fine
craftsman. I disliked the opening
scene with God, dressed like a guru
in white linen, stepping out of a
circle of blinding light. I don't know
whose idea it was to have God awakening Adam in an exact facsimile of
the Michelangelo pose. It worked
like a teaser and set the tone for the
whole production. It was too cheap
in its obviousness. I also felt uneasy
about Eve giving birth to Cain on
stage. Many more things were in
line with all that happens East of
Eden, with one exception: the final
fearful embrace of the two first
lovers, a gesture which was the best
of all the stage ideas brought about
by the folksiness. This gesture was
accompanied by Lucifer's curtain
line: "God is only what ought to be
and I am what is."

new nor profound. It may have
come as Miller's final sigh since he
could not find a satisfactory answer
to his initial question On The
Human Dilemma. Each of the three
acts poses a question. First, why did
God make Lucifer? Since God is
goo.d and made everything, Miller
seems to think this work must have
been a slip of his creative hand.
Lucifer is an ambitious angel, he
wants to rule with God, leaving love
to the Master and knowledge to
himself. The greater the people's
awareness, the more they would
praise him. If he had something to
say, there would be no sin, no friction, no guilt. God rejects the offer
for emotional reasons when he answers: "I don't love you!"
Now Lucifer is out to be loved by
man. He kisses Cain at his birth,
claiming him as his own. In accordance with Lucifer's first-act argument that he is for harmony, awareness, knowledge - he tries to prevent the first murder, but fails.
Thus, all blame for getting man off
at a wrong start is laid at God's
doorstep.
In an interview in The New York
Ti'mes Arthur Miller maintained
that this is "a play with an enormous
amount of interpretive theatricality." Maybe so. I share his opinion
that "these are mythological figures
that require a certain style." Although I think that he still is one of
our great playwrights, probably
the greatest next to O'Neill, I disagree with him that the play needs
to be staged again to show his critics
"what the play is abol.lt." On the
other hand, I feel that, if God made
Lucifer, Arthur Miller has the right
to have made a bad play.
0
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Somehow this sentence came as a
relief, as one of the better statements
in the play, even though it is neither
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BOOKS
A GOD WITHIN.
By Rene Dubos, Charles Scribner's Sons,
1972. $8.95.

Dr. Dubos has written considerably more into this badly-named
volume than man and his environment. He ranges broadly and critically over the history of man on this
planet and, although he feels the
term is too limited, over "human
ecology." Having read many essays
and articles on man's problems with
his environment, I have read none
which presents as far-ranging and
thorough a review of man and nature interacting. Dr. Dubos discusses
those conditions in which nature
shapes man and those where man
has shaped and reshaped nature.
Being a medical scientist he does
not fail to keep the basic biological
nature of man close to the front in
his various ar~uments-without
losing the unique~ess of man as an
individual, a free agent with his
perceptual limitations, a biological
being of great sensitivity and unmatched power.
In Chapter 2, entitled "A Theology
of the Earth," Dr. Dubos states,
"A truly ecological view of the world
has religious overtones." He sees
man as leading an enduring existence on this planet only if he engages himself in the interrelationships of all of nature rather than
continuing "the crude belief that
man is the only value to be considered in managing the world and that
the rest of nature can be thoughtlessly sacrificed to his welfare and
whims." He suggests that we begin
seriously to follow the directive of
God given to man in the Garden of
Eden, "to till it f the earth], and keep
it" (RSV Gen. 2:15). It is almost as
if this word were the eleventh commandment for the purpose of maintaining an environment of high
quality where man can really live
in his potential humanness.
The Cresset

The author does not accept the
thesis that man in the last two hundred years has become more ruthless to the planet than in any of his
previous history. The greatest disruptions of the natural ecosystems
occurred over a period of thousands
of years as man pushed back raw,
unspoiled nature to develop agriculture on the most fertile lands.
Much of the land has been shaped
and reshaped as man has adopted
improved methods of farming. Although some of this land (i.e. Japan
and Western Europe) has been under
rigorous cultivation for thousands
of years, other regions (i.e. the
Mediterranean basin of the Ancient
world) have been carelessly managed over many centuries and have
become worthless for agriculture.
Man's ecological mismanagement
has been disastrous in the past.
Certainly this is a warning that our
current environmental problems
can have very serious consequences.
But Dr. Dubos remains optimistic:
since man in the past has also had
great successes in preserving a quality environment, he can solve his
current problems "by pointed human effort."
Chapter 8, "Franciscan Conservatism versus Benedictine Stewardship," offers a rebuttal to Lynn
White, Jr.'s famous essay, "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological
Crisis" (Science, 1967). White's
article has been widely quoted and
reprinted in a number of compendia
of environmental subjects. Basically
his thesis is that the selfish exploitation of the earth's resources with
its concomitant spoilage of nature
did not seriously begin until the
Judeo-Christian religions shifted
man's attitude toward an anthropomorphic God. This view, it is
argued, then placed man above nature. White suggests that man needs
to adopt the attitude of St. Francis
of Assisi who believed "in the virtue
of humility-not merely for the
individual but for man as a species"
and who "tried to substitute the idea
of the equality of all creatures, including man, for the idea of man's
limitless rule of creation." He proFebruary, 1978

posed "Francis as a patron saint for
ecologists." Dr. Dubos makes a
case that men , throughout their
existence on this planet, have "pillaged nature and disturbed the
ecological equilibrium," due generally to ignorance but often to shortsighted selfish goals. And, rather
than accepting St. Francis' "absolute
identification with nature," he proposes that man's place in the environment should be modeled after
the teachings of St. Benedict which
have led to our understanding "that
true conservation means not only
protecting nature against human behavior but also developing human
activities which favor a creative,
harmonious relationship between
man and nature." Since I cannot
see man not using this planet's
resources or not managing nature,
St. Benedict is more acceptable to
me as the patron saint of ecology.
Dubos concludes the chapter by
saying that "Reverence for nature
is compatible with willingness to
accept responsibility for a creative
stewardship of the earth."
The environmental movement of
the past decade has too often gyrated
between oversimplified extrapolations of existing damage and impending crises expressed by one
alarmist or another. Some of these
deadlines for catastrophe have
passed, while others are rapidly
approaching; and since the predicted disasters have not occurred,
people are questioning the credibility of environmentalists in general. Dr. Dubos is not an alarmist,
although he admits that public
attention is quickly aroused with
unexpected sick and dead human
beings. However, he raises more
fundamental questions concerning
the degradation of our environment and its subtle effects on man's
humanness, on his spirit, on his
quality of life. In short, is this
environmental mess created by man
the environment in which man can
exercise his unique human nature?
I have searched for a contemporary book of moderate length which
can set the problems of the environment into a historical perspective

and into a thoughtful attitude of
love and care for nature's gifts which
I could recommend to students in
my environment course. Dubos'
A God Within is that book, and I
submit that any person with an interest in the environment will
appreciate the author's concern and
responsibility for this planet as I
expect my students will.

ROBERT J.HANSON

EVERYDAY LIFE IN BIBLE TIMES.
National Geographic Society, n.d . $9.95.

Although this book came out several years ago I believe it is still the
most scintillating volume I know of
on the world of the Bible. The
National Geographic Society has
dealt with ancient discoveries for
long enough time now to know how
to put a story together. This is beautifully done in this volume. The
numerous photographs of ancient
sites and discoveries, of modem villages and modes of life illustrating
the Bible, are almost always brilliant, and often breath-taking. Artistic imagination plays freely in recreating biblical scenes and events,
but is always knowledgeable of the
many things we now know about
that strange and important world.
The text is wholly reliable; how
could it be otherwise with clear and
exciting contributions by some of
the best scholars in these areas of
study - Samuel Noah Kramer on
ancient Mesopotamia, John Wilson
on Egypt, and G. Ernest Wright and
Roland de Vaux on the Holy Land
itself during both Old Testament
and New Testament times.
I cannot think of a nicer volume
as a gift to a friend, a family, or a
church library.
WALTER E. RAST

SPEARPOINT.
By Sylvia Ashton-Warner. Alfred A. Knopf,
1972. $5.95.

In 1963 a very provocative book
appeared: Teacher, by Sylvia Ashton-Warner. Who is Sylvia? A
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teacher from New Zealand, evidently an unusually successful
teacher, one with deep understanding of young children and remarkable insights into the learning
process.
This author with the compound
name had a simple message: teaching should be organic, not plastering something on the child but,
rather, unfolding something from
the inner world of the child's feelings. Thus the child should not be
given a primer to learn how to read
someone else's words; he should
grow his own primer from words
that have an intense meaning for
him. Seeing the child as a volcano
with two vents- one for creativity,
the other for destructiveness Ashton-Warner sought to direct
every subject to the creative vent.
She undeniably succeeded in producing not only learning but also
joy in learning. Then she wrote
about her teaching trenchantly,
avoiding the current educationese.
Thus Teacher was born.
Readers were impressed with
Ashton-Warner's book, but some
said: "That's what life can be like in
a Maori infant school. Wonder what
she'd do with my third graders in
Gary? Would she survive in a real ,
live American school?"
After visits to schools in England,
Israel, and Asia, Ashton-Warner
did come to the United States - to
an experimental school on top of
the Rockies. Spearpoint is the account of that experience.
In Spearpoint, Ashton-Warner is
still concerned with organic teaching: releasing the native imagery of
the child and using it for working
material. But she finds it much more
difficult to get at the native imagery
of our children. She's baffled :
Not that I find any hatred here
in our new kind of school,
not a sign of it. I find quarrelsomeness, discontent, unwillingness and rudeness to a
degree I've never encountered before, but I do not sense
hatred. I've known far more
naked hatred in small children in other parts of the
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world. But I don't sense love
here, either. What's happened
to the dynamo of feeling? . ..
Why don't they think and do
things, rather than loll on the
floor between the knees of
teachers; why don't they want
to do things, why can't they
grow, why don't they go?
She wonders what makes the children as they are. Has the imagery
of American children been extinguished by television's overstimulation, "the house of the mmfl gatecra~hed and occupied -by invading
nonliving imagery"? Worse yet,
have teachers themselves broken
into children's minds, routed out
the native images and brought in
housefuls of alien images belonging
to the teachers ?
Simultaneously the teacher
takes over occupancy of the
other houses in the street, the
minds of the other children in
his class, so that now we have
the same kind of imagery in
every one of the houses, all
copies of the teacher, in a
street named Conformity. As
for all the former native occupants of the houses, now deceased, it's what I call murder
of the imagery. Spiritually
speaking, millions of children are murdered annually.
As a result, Ashton-Warner wonders, are all teachers now expected
to entertain rather than to teach?
The people who started the free
school in Aspen, Colorado, didn't
want death at an early age for their
children's minds. They wanted a
freer development for their children, and they thought that organic
teaching might be an answer. Thus
they invited Miss Ashton-Warner
(who's really Mrs. Henderson) to
join their venture. Soon both the
inviters and the invitee learned that
they attached different meanings to
freedom.
What is this thing, freedom,
supplied to the children in
overspilling glassfuls, in tankards, in brimming kegs? Must
glorious freedom mean all
this? Is this, indeed, freedom?

If it is, what good is it? How

long is the equipment going to
last . . . ? And, as equipment,
how long will I last?
I'm impressed indeed by
what they call freedom among
the incoming children, but
less impressed by the freedom
for teachers. . . I'm already
learning that children are the
lords of creation whose desires
and whims are law.
Equality .. . appears to mean
inverted authority. There's
authority here but not from me.
The author pleads for structure,
for routine which will give shape to
the day. "This doesn't happen to
be freedom as it is ; it's intoxication."
She chuckles at attempts to substitute "guidance" for a bad word,
"discipline." "The wannadowanna
has nothing whatever to do with
freedom of the mind .. . and everything to do with its shackles."
The whole day can be a large
shapely vessel made out of
order, into which we pour all
we've got. A shape contoured
by benign routine which helps
to stabilize, which in turn
engenders responsibility. For
in making a new kind of school,
stability and responsibility are
major requirements for freedom of the mind.
Perhaps this is the most valuable
contribution of this work: the insistence that a structure for learning is compatible with- in fact,
essential to - the freedom of the
mind.
Our schools are as they are because our society is as it is. How
does the author evaluate our society? .
Very highly , in some respects: she
speaks of having come from the tail
end of civilization to its spearpoint.
However, there are dangers. She
tells us that the enriched may really
be the deprived.
Affluence is one of our troubles. The thing about deprivation is that it makes you dream ,
and a dream is a germ of living and exercises the imagery.
This is the main aim in organic
work ...
Th e Cresse :

Ashton-Warner is concerned about
our children.

hand, whereas work never
falters.

I do ponder ... on the story
the K.V. (Key Vocabulary)
tells me of this particular
society, the post-industrial,
advanceguard point of it;
why it varies so from the norm
of a happy child.
. . . Our children may be
victimized by overstimulation,
the attention span concertinaed, the third dimension
femotionl erased and the
vision fragmented.

Neither my love life nor my life's
work - to say nothing of my theology
- supports such conclusions.
The weaknesses, however, are
incidental: they don't destroy the
largercontributions which the author
makes in helping us understand
children, the learning process, and
our culture. Of course, there are
those who now will say that, in going to a unique free school in Aspen,
Ashton-Warner still hasn't come to
American schools: "I still wonder
what she'd do with my third grade
in Gary!"
Ashton-Warner's visit was of limited duration and restricted area.
Therefore she does not presume to
pontificate about the ills of American schools. She does, however,
raise disturbing questions. As de
Tocqueville and de Gurowski have
shown, visitors from other lands
can help us see ourselves as others
see us. The danger is - to use a
simile from James-that, having observed ourselves in a mirror, we go
away and forget what needs attention.

These are thought-provoking
words, which make the book a
valuable prod to complacent minds.
All in all, this is a significant book.
The book does have flaws. For one
thing, Ashton-Warner is a crusader
for a point of view, and, like most
crusaders, she tends to repeat herself. Some sections of the book could
have been put into a neater organization, but the author- and possibly
many a reader - prefers spontaneous communication to the polish of
a re-write. Generally Ashton-Warner's new terms are helpful, like
"second movement" instead of
"second grade"; sometimes they are
inspired, like "wannadowanna"
for the child-decision approach to
curriculum; at times, however, they
seem striven for, like "muperson"
for a person mutated (better you
should use it for that sorority-enthused sophomore from Mu Epsilon!). On occasion this author
lapses from her usual pithy style to
pure treacle: "Teeth sculptured in
ice, ears pearl crescents, while to
look at the skin is to drink fresh
milk sunseted in pink." Even as a
description of an apocalyptic vision, such prose is too much! Further, some of the many conclusions
about life, introduced almost as
asides, are hard to take:
When I was younger, I tussled
for years over the place and
the style of work. Which, for
instance, was closer to God:
love or work? And finally concluded ... work. For love has
seasons and can die in your
February, 1973
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FREE SCHOOLS.
By Jonathan Kozol.
Hou11hton Mifflin Company, 1972.

$4.95.

If you have a name in the free
school movement and a desire to
make money for the cause, then
write another book. That this was
the motive of Jonathan Kozol in
writing Free Schools should become
apparent to the reader prior to
the author's confession to the fact
on the last page of the book.
The bulk of Free Schools is devoted to such revelations and advice as:
disease, drugs, and starvation exist
in the ghetto

people in free schools
should not fight
among
themselves
all adults
involved in free schools
do not
care
for
kids
in order to get money
free schools can either
work for it or get it from charity
hassles
from authorities
can be expected
To label such as a "handbook for
survival" indicates more put-on
than naivete. But even the name
Kozol and a title so inclusive that
no one dared use it before is not
enough to sell put-on pap. So an early
five and one-half pages are devoted
to criticizing types of free schools
that do not fit Kozol's current model
of a valid alternative. What he advocates is good, but he should note
that the title of his book suggests
a plurality of forms.
To state that alternatives within
the system are bound to be ineffective because they are accountable
to the flag is to ignore that most
institutional change is brought
about by inside rather than outside forces.
Comparing the upper-class rural
free school with a "sandbox for the
children of the SS Guards at Auschwitz" is probably valid. However,
this analogy either ignores that
there is as great a need for the liberation of rich whites as there is for
poor blacks or denies that the means
of liberation may differ. Being in
the sandbox may lead to more truth
than being in school under the domination of the sisters of the SS Guards.
Although this book could give
some comfort to the skill-pushers,
it is probably harmless. If you want
to be confronted with the real issues facing free schools read John
Holt's Freedom and Beyond instead.

LEONARD KOCHENDORFER
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John Strietelme1er

BEYOND THE NEWS

Newspapers and television are
frequently criticized for publicizing
the nasty and the bizarre, and passing over the good news, the stories
of everyday courage and kindness
and nobility. The result, their critics
say, is to present an unbalanced view
of the world, a view which fails to
take into account all of the dimensions of man. And surely there is
good reason for such criticism, although the criticism would come
with better grace from a reading
public which actually supported
quality publications in preference
to the sensationalist press.
In any case, this column is an attempt (which will probably not come
off very well because there is really
nothing very colorful or dramatic
about the story I am going to tell)
to redress the balance by relating
what may be, under the eye of eternity, one of the great stories of recent years - at least one which has
had profound repercussions in the
life and thought of those who are
close enough to the principals to
feel some small sense of participa-
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tion in their remarkable adventure
in faith and courage.
Ralph was a student here at the
university ten years ago - bright,
active, a promoter, an organizer,
and a leader. We became friends and
we frequently talked about Ralph's
future. Like many especially talented
young people, he was having some
difficulty deciding which of the
many interesting things open to
him he should concentrate on professionally. The question was complicated by a desire to marry the
lovely and talented young lady he
was dating and whom, as a matter
of fact, he married while still in
college.
From my point of view, at least, it
did not seem terribly important
what career Ralph chose to pursue;
it see!Iled to me that he could hardly
fail to make a success of almost anything that he might settle on. And
when, eventually, he went into business I was not surprised to hear,
after a year or two, that he was doing
very well. But business did not satisfy his intellectual curiosity or his
craving for the company of people
who shared his interests in literature
and the arts. So when an opening
developed in our admissions office,
he returned to the University as an
admissions counselor.
And then, quite without warning,
the blow fell. He had hardly settled
in his new job when he learned that
the tired feeling he had been experiencing was an early symptom of
lupus erythematosus, a disease
which is still a mystery to medicine
but which is inevitably fatal, usually
within a very short time. So there
were Ralph and Linda, with two very
small children and no prospects
except crippling expenses to fight
an illness which, in the long run
(and perhaps not all that long, at
tnat) was sure to prevail.
There is no point to rehearsing
the long and involved clinical history of Ralph's affliction -the bad

times, the occasional apparent
remissions, the painful experiences
with the dialysis machine, the kidney
transplant, the whole long battle
under the direction of a brilliant and
sympathetic physician-friend to
stave off the inevitable. More important than the battle ·for physical
survival was the struggle to keep the
faith. This struggle, too, had its ups
and downs, its moments of nearultimate despair and its moments
of profound joy in the realization
that it is those whom the Lord loves
that receive His chastening.
Now, journalistically, what can
you do with a story like that? There
is really no way of conveying to
anyone who has not experienced it
the radical meaning of dE- ~pair,
and there is even less possibility of
even suggesting the full meaning of
joy in Christ. And in between these
peaks and troughs there is only the
day-to-day business of holding on on the physical level to each new
hope that medicine offers, and on
the spiritual level to the promises
of God, which often offer little hope
or comfort to the weary flesh. And
yet, for many of us in our small
community, Ralph and Unda have
become something like prophets,
opening up to us insights into the
ways o God with man and shaming
all of the pettiness of our lives
which, by comparison with theirs,
have been singularly free of any
real grounds of complaint.
At this writing, Ralph is in hospital again and, as usual, does not
know what God has planned for
him. He is beyond the need of any
man's sympathy, but not, perhaps,
beyond the capacity to accept a
friend's gratitude, admiration, and
affection - all of which go with him
as he enters once more behind the
veil where he is involved in the
secret workings of God, a little of
whose reflected glory he brings with
him each time he comes back to us.
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